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Abstract
This article assesses the possible populist discourse contagion experienced by the Spanish 
Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) due to the irruption of Podemos. To this end, a content anal-
ysis has been carried out on a selection of PSOE manifestos for national and European elections, 
published between 2004 and 2019. The results show that the evolution of PSOE’s anti-elitism 
is not necessarily related to the competition with Podemos but to the party’s opposition status, 
especially in contexts of citizen discontent. Therefore, the main results suggest that the political 
decline of traditional parties could be a more decisive factor than the emergence and rise of new 
parties, when explaining the shifts in party identity. In addition, the article shows that populist 
messages have played three main functions in PSOE’s manifestos: i) to show empathy with and 
understanding of people’s unrest in contexts of citizen dissatisfaction; ii) to attack the main 
political competitor when the party is in opposition; and iii) to use economic powers and other 
elites as scapegoats, especially when the party is in government.
Keywords: populism, anti-elitism, popular sovereignty, political parties, content analysis, party 
manifestos.
Resumen
Este artículo analiza el posible contagio del discurso populista experimentado por el Partido 
Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE) por la irrupción de Podemos. Para ello se ha realizado un 
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análisis de contenido en una selección de programas electorales nacionales y europeos del PSOE 
publicados entre 2004 y 2019. Los resultados muestran que la evolución del antielitismo en los 
programas del PSOE no está necesariamente relacionada con la competición con Podemos, sino 
con el estatus de oposición del partido, especialmente en contextos de descontento ciudadano. 
Por tanto, los principales resultados sugieren que el declive político de los partidos tradicionales 
podría ser un factor más decisivo que el surgimiento y el auge de nuevos partidos a la hora de 
explicar los cambios en la identidad de los mismos. Asimismo, el artículo muestra que los mensajes 
populistas han jugado tres funciones principales en los programas del PSOE: mostrar empatía y 
comprensión con el malestar del pueblo en contextos de insatisfacción ciudadana; atacar al 
competidor principal cuando el partido está en la oposición, y utilizar los poderes económicos y 
otras élites como chivos expiatorios, especialmente cuando el partido está en el Gobierno.
Palabras clave: populismo, antielitismo, soberanía popular, partidos políticos, análisis de conte-
nido, programas electorales.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional party politics in Spain has been completely reshaped since 2014-2015 
up to the present. The 2008 international economic crisis, the lack of institutional 
response to the demands of the population during the great recession, several corruption 
scandals in the traditional political parties and the territorial crisis are among the most 
important factors that explain the recent changes in the Spanish party system. The 
most visible effects of these changes are the increase of the electoral volatility and parlia-
mentary fragmentation. In this sense, the parliamentary distribution of seats that resulted 
from the 2015 general elections led to the repetition of the electoral process a few months 
later in 2016, because the parliamentary groups were unable to agree on the appointment 
of a prime minister. It was the first time this had happened in the history of present-day 
Spanish democracy. The actors most benefited by this unprecedented electoral situation 
were two new political parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos, which respectively became the 
third and fourth political parties in votes and seats in the 2015 general elections. 
In addition to the rise of new political forces, we must consider the electoral emer-
gence of populism, previously unknown in Spain. Before the irruption of Podemos in 
2014, no other party in Spain had developed a populist discourse with such intensity 
and success. Unlike other countries that had not successfully experienced the populist 
phenomenon until recently (e.g. United Kingdom or Sweden), the rise of populism in 
Spain has not been progressive but completely abrupt. Founded just four months 
before the 2014 European elections, Podemos became the fourth party in votes and 
seats in a very short period of time, and even the first in voting intention in a concrete 
moment, according to some electoral polls1. One year later, their local candidacies and 
1. Garea, Fernando. 2014. “Podemos supera a PSOE y PP y rompe el tablero electoral”, El País, 
2-11-2014. Retrieved from: www.elpais.com (last accessed: 3-6-2020). 
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confluences came to power in the biggest cities of the country (Madrid and Barce-
lona), other medium capitals (e.g. Cádiz) and became the parliamentary partners for 
socialist governments in five regions (Valencia, Baleares, Extremadura, Castilla 
La-Mancha and Aragón), as well as the support of the government in Navarra (led by 
Geroa Bai). Finally, in their first general elections Podemos became the third political 
party in votes and seats (20.7 % of votes and 69 seats —Podemos and allied—), very 
close to the results reached by PSOE (22 % and 90 seats). The support of Podemos in 
the 2015 elections came from former voters of United Left (IU), Union, Progress and 
Democracy (UPyD), the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), new voters 
and non-voters. In this sense, the irruption of Podemos and its regional confluences 
was more harmful for the PSOE than the rise of Ciudadanos in the 2015 elections; 
since the first managed to get 23 % of the votes from former Socialist voters in contrast 
to 8 % from Ciudadanos (Delgado-Fernández and Cazorla-Martín, 2017: 253). 
Considering Podemos’ electoral breakthrough in the Spanish political system, this 
article aims to assess the possible populist discourse contagion experienced by the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), its closer competitor. Thus, the contribu-
tion of this article relates to the study of political parties’ behavior, and more specifi-
cally, to the presumed impact of populism on party competition. In this regard, the 
Spanish case represents an interesting object of study, since the emergence of populism 
has been completely abrupt in the country. In addition, the results of this study may 
help to understand the Popular Party’s responses to the recent challenge from the 
populist radical right.
The article is structured as follows: First, we address the socio-political context 
where the decline of the PSOE and the emergence of Podemos took place. Second, we 
discuss the concept of populism and the main hypotheses of the study, taking into 
consideration the literature on the impact that the emergence of populist parties has 
on mainstream parties. After that, we present the research design; followed by the 
main results. Finally, the later are discussed and interpreted in the conclusions.
THE IRRUPTION OF PODEMOS AND THE POLITICAL DECLINE  
OF THE PSOE
The electoral success of Podemos in 2014-2015 can be understood as the result of the 
political decline of the main left party in the country, PSOE, as well as citizen dissatisfac-
tion with the political actors and the functioning of democracy (Della Porta et al., 2017; 
Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018b; Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). With regard to 
the former, the PSOE experienced a traumatic electoral and political decline in 2011, 
after two terms in government (it lost 15.1 % of votes and 59 seats, which constituted its 
worst result since 1977). Like other European Social Democratic parties, the PSOE had 
to implement harsh austerity policies during the Great Recession (Barberá and Rodríguez-
Teruel, 2020). Notwithstanding, the unemployment rate and public debt levels remained 
alarmingly high, calling into question the socialist government’s ability to manage the 
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crisis. In addition, the type of economic policies adopted (e.g. worsening labor rights, 
cuts in social spending, the reform of article 135 of the Constitution to guarantee the 
payment of debt interest, etc.) undermined the party’s ideological credibility among 
leftist voters. As a consequence of the elements mentioned above, the party started to face 
serious problems as an organization: ideological-programmatic confusion; decreasing 
membership; difficulties to consolidate its national leadership and rapid electoral decline 
(Delgado-Fernández and Cazorla-Martín, 2017). All that was emphasized by new party 
competitors on both sides of the ideological continuum.
The economic crisis together with several corruption scandals within the main 
political parties led the country into a cycle of social protests in 2010-2011, that 
culminated in a profound change in the party system in the 2015 and 2016 elections 
(Della Porta et al., 2017). As Figure 1 shows, dissatisfaction with the economy of the 
country reached an historical peak in 2011 (89.3 % of voters felt that the economic 
situation was bad or very bad), while dissatisfaction with the functioning of democ-
racy exceeded 30 % for the first time. Since then, the perception of the state of the 
economy improved significantly, but not democratic dissatisfaction, which remains 
above 30 %. In this connection, Figure 2 confirms that political discontent continued 
to grow: the percentage of the population that considered politicians, political parties 
and politics as one of the main problems of the country increased significantly in 2011 
(22.6 %), as well as corruption and fraud in 2014 (35.7 %). Therefore, what started as 
an economic crisis led to a crisis of political confidence and dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of democracy, which would later be aggravated by the territorial crisis.
Figure 1. 
Evolution of dissatisfaction with the state of the economy and the functioning of 
democracy in Spain (2004-2019)
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) and European Social Survey 
(dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy of 2004 and 2008).
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Figure 2. 
Main problems of the country (2004-2019)
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS).
As Della Porta et al. argue, “the wave of protests against austerity and ‘for a real 
democracy’ prepared the terrain for Podemos” (2017: 48). In this regard, the elections 
held in 2011 revealed not only the economic discontent with PSOE, but also the 
growing distancing of the party led by Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba from the 15-M move-
ment young voters (Rodríguez-Teruel et al., 2016). This election also highlighted the 
incapacity of other minority parties such as IU and UPyD to capitalize on the discon-
tent with governing parties; thus, contributing to the crisis of representation that 
favored the emergence of new parties, especially Podemos (Fernández-García and 
Luengo, 2018b). Given Podemos left-wing orientation, the rise of this new populist 
party has taken place at the expense of its potential closer competitors within the same 
ideological space; that is, the PSOE and other minority left-wing parties such as the 
United Left (IU). In the case of IU, it was seriously damaged by the irruption of 
Podemos: the party lost nine of its eleven seats in the 2015 elections. The PSOE also 
suffered a considerable electoral loss as a result of the emergence of Podemos: 23 % of 
the votes for the new party in the 2015 general elections came from former socialist 
voters (Delgado-Fernández and Cazorla-Martín, 2017). For the 2016 elections, the 
former Communist Party and other minority left parties agreed to run together with 
Podemos, under an alternative coalition labelled Unidos Podemos. In this situation, 
the PSOE remained Podemos’ main competitor at the electoral arena.
Considering the above-mentioned developments, this article aims to analyze if the 
populist discourse of Podemos had any effect on its main competitor, the PSOE. 
According to the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2014), the main issues underlined by 
Podemos were anti-elitism, political corruption and economic redistribution. On the 
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one hand, anti-elitism is one of the core elements of populism (Mudde, 2004) and was 
the main feature of the new political organization. Indeed, Podemos emerged in 2014 
with a hard discourse against the casta política and the main institutions of the country, 
considering them as anti-democratic and corrupt actors (Ivaldi et al., 2017). On the 
other hand, Podemos combined this anti-establishment and anti-corruption discourse 
with a left-wing program, especially in the economic dimension. The party proposed 
several redistributive economic measures, such as universal basic income and raising 
taxes on the wealthiest. 
The Manifesto Project2 provides information about the political parties’ positions 
on the last two issues: economic distribution3 and corruption4 (Figure 3), which allows 
us to verify if the Socialist Party has responded to the competition by Podemos by 
increasing salience on these two issues in its manifestos. First, the presence of positive 
statements about equality (e.g. need for fair distribution of resources) has followed a 
growing trend in PSOE manifestos during the 2000s. However, the maximum peak 
is found in the 2011electoral program (8.67 %). Therefore, the increasing attention to 
this issue cannot be attributed to a strategic response to the success of Podemos in 
2015, but to the impact of the Great Recession in the country. Regarding the presence 
of anti-corruption statements, they were almost absent in the party’s manifestos 
between 2000 and 2011 (0.16 % on average). The salience of this issue increased 
significantly in the 2015 and 2016 manifestos (2.8 and 2.9 % respectively), coinciding 
with the emergence of Podemos. Although the anti-corruption discourse is not synon-
ymous with populism, this issue occupies a central role for populist actors, especially 
in Southern Europe (Fernández-García, 2019). Thus, the trend identified in PSOE’s 
manifestos gives us a clue about the possible populist contagion effect that Podemos’ 
success in 2015 and 2016 had on the PSOE. 
In addition, PSOE’s evolution since 2015 also leads us to presume that this party 
has included some populist appeals in its discourse. For instance, in a very controver-
sial interview, the Socialist Party leader, Pedro Sánchez, affirmed that some “factual” 
powers had prevented his party from reaching a government agreement with Podemos 
in 20155. Certain aspects of the party’s primary process in 2016 can also be under-
stood within the populist frame. In this regard, the mobilization of the grassroots 
against the party elites, as well as the claims to empower the party members was very 
present in Pedro Sánchez’s candidacy (Simón, 2017; Lancaster, 2017; Barberá and 
2. Availabe at: https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/.
3. Per 503: We selected the variable of “Equality: Positive” to measure the positions of the party 
in the redistributive dimension. Following the codebook, it refers to “Concept of social justice 
and the need for fair treatment of all people. This may include: Special protection for under-
privileged social groups; Removal of class barriers; Need for fair distribution of resources; The 
end of discrimination (e.g. racial or sexual discrimination)” (p. 17).
4. Per 304: “Need to eliminate political corruption and associated abuses of political and/or 
bureaucratic power. Need to abolish clientelist structures and practices” (p. 13). 
5. Available at: https://bit.ly/3kRBbEP.
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Rodríguez-Teruel, 2020). Finally, the comparative study by Fernández-García and 
Luengo (2018a) also showed the existence of a considerable degree of anti-elitism in 
the PSOE manifesto for the 2015 elections. However, this study is not a longitudinal 
one and, therefore, it is not possible to conclude this anti-elitism is a consequence of 
Podemos’ irruption. As a result, we will study the evolution of the core elements 
of populism in PSOE manifestos, in order to find the presence of a populist contagion 
as an effect of Podemos. 
Figure 3. 
Presence of quasi-sentences (%) coded as “Equality: Positive” (Redistribution) and 
“Corruption” in the election manifestos of PSOE (2000-2016)
Source: Own elaboration with data from the Manifesto Project.
POPULISM: CONCEPT AND IMPACT ON MAINSTREAM PARTIES
The theoretical framework of this study considers populism as a set of ideas that 
can be communicated discursively by different actors, such as political parties, media 
and citizens (De Vreese et al., 2018). According to this approach that combines the 
ideology-centered and discourse-centered understanding of populism, the emphasis 
“is on populist messages as independent ‘phenomenon as such’ and no longer on a 
particular party family or type of politician” (ibid.: 426). This implies that political 
actors —including traditional political parties— may communicate populist ideas in 
different degrees and that these expressions can be empirically measured. 
Regarding the main features of populism, Mudde’s definition (2004) has found a 
high consensus in the literature due to its proven applicability in empirical research 
(Roodujin and Pauwels, 2011; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015; March, 2017; Ivaldi 
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et al., 2017; Fernández-García y Luengo, 2018a): “An (thin) ideology that considers 
society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 
“the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be 
an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). 
However, we found different interpretations regarding the combination of the 
core elements of populism identified by that definition. For instance, the analyses by 
Roodujin and Pauwels (2011) and Rooduijn and Akkerman (2015) considered the 
simultaneous presence of people-centrism and anti-elitism to be sufficient to satisfy 
the ideational definition criteria. More recently, March’s case study for the United 
Kingdom (2017) and the cross-national studies by Manucci and Weber (2017), and 
Fernández-García and Luengo (2018a) followed the triple criteria stated by Mudde 
and Rovira (2013), according to which the three elements of the definition have to be 
present (positive mentions to the people, negative references to the elite and popular 
sovereignty). Nevertheless, the studies by March (2017) and Fernández-García and 
Luengo (2018a) found that the presence of people-centrism (positive references to the 
people) in mainstream parties was very high, even higher than the people-centrism of 
left-wing populist parties (not in the case of the right-wing ones). Indeed, both kinds 
of parties (populist and non-populist parties) tend to refer to the people as a whole 
(e.g. “the people”, “citizens”, “ordinary families”, etc.), to express belonging to the 
people (e.g. using the words we/our) and to speak on behalf of the people. The main 
difference is that populist parties tend to do it using an antagonistic division between 
the people and the elite, whereas mainstream organizations use it to express belonging 
or closeness to the people. The presence of people-centrism in the latter was labelled 
by March (2017) as “demoticism”, a way to show “closeness to “ordinary” people 
without this antagonistic identity” (ibid: 290). The author interprets its use as a conse-
quence of their condition of catch-all parties and increasing societal mediatization. In 
addition, Fernández-García and Luengo (2018a) showed that non-populist and popu-
list parties differ in the radicalization of the popular sovereignty by the introduction 
of direct democracy mechanisms. 
Hence, in order to simplify the analysis, we will focus on these two core elements 
of populism that seem to be potentially useful in order to better differentiate between 
populist and non-populist parties: anti-elitism and the radicalization of popular sover-
eignty. The first element introduces the antagonistic character of politics and society 
which is necessary to define populism. The reasoning behind the second element also 
shows an anti-elitist and people-centrist conception of politics by which the people, 
and not politicians, should make the main political decisions.
There are few studies that empirically examine the effects that the success of 
populism has on mainstream parties. In addition, most of them tend to focus on the 
effects of the anti-immigrant appeals of right-wing populist parties on mainstream 
parties (e.g. Harmel and Svasand, 1997; Downs, 2001; Minkenberg, 2001; Bale et al., 
2010; Van Spanje, 2010; Han, 2015; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018). That is, they 
focus on the effects of their “host ideologies” but not on the effects of their populist 
ideology as such. These studies seem to confirm that the success of radical right-wing 
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parties or anti-immigrant parties has an impact on the ideological, migratory or multi-
culturalist positions of mainstream parties, especially those of right-wing parties. 
Other studies have focused on the influence that the rise of Eurosceptic challenger 
parties (whether on the left or the right) has on mainstream parties. In this regard, 
Meijers (2015) found that the electoral success of these emerging organizations 
provokes mainstream parties to be less supportive of European integration. 
In the case of populism such as Rooduijn et al. (2014) tried to cover this gap in the 
literature by analyzing the effects of populist parties on mainstream parties in five 
countries (France, United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy). They 
concluded that the electoral programs of mainstream parties have not become more 
populist in recent years, as a consequence of the competition with populist actors. 
Manucci and Weber (2017) did not find evidence to confirm the existence of a popu-
list Zeitgeist in Western Europe, either: they did not observe a linear increase of 
populism in election manifestos between 1970 and 2010. However, other studies 
observed populist elements in the discourse of mainstream political actors such as the 
former Australian Prime John Howard and Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
(Snow and Moffitt, 2012), the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair (Mair, 
2000), the former vice-premier of Flanders Steve Stevaert (Mudde, 2004) as well as in 
the manifestos of some mainstream parties such as the British Conservative and 
Labour parties (March, 2017), the PSOE and the Irish Labour Party (Fernán-
dez-García and Luengo, 2018a). These cases have been labelled as “mainstream 
populism” or “soft populism” to denote less extreme versions of populist discourse.
The main theoretical framework of the studies that analyze the impact of new 
actors on existing actors comes from the classic spatial theory by Anthony Downs 
(1957) and the later “modified spatial theories” (e.g. Meguid, 2005). The main idea 
taken from the classic spatial theory is that the ideological closeness is a very decisive 
factor to take into account in order to examine the interrelation and potential conta-
gion between political parties: the less remote the ideological distance with the emer-
gent party is, the more vulnerable the situation for existing (traditional) political 
organizations will be. In this regard, populism itself is neither left nor right, but is 
normally accompanied by a “full” or “host ideology”. In Western European countries, 
populist parties present a clear ideological profile, mainly on the radical right but also 
on the radical left, such as Podemos (Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018a). There-
fore, the emergence of these organizations tends to be more damaging for parties that 
are in the same ideological space. As we pointed out in the previous section, Podemos’ 
electoral success was to the detriment of the electoral support of other left-wing polit-
ical parties such as the United Left and the PSOE.
Regarding the reaction to the success of new parties, the modified spatial theories 
state that mainstream parties can adopt three different strategies (Meguid, 2005). 
First, traditional parties can decide to ignore the main issues addressed by the new 
competitor (“dismissive strategy”), in the hope that this strategy will lead to a decrease 
in the salience of these issues. Second, mainstream parties can decide to recognize and 
respond to the new issues by establishing an official position towards them. In this 
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case, a mainstream party may adopt a divergence strategy (“adversarial strategy”) or 
one of convergence (“accommodative strategy”). In the last strategy, traditional parties 
try to co-opt the issues proposed by the emerging party, claiming those are rooted in 
their own organizations. 
HYPOTHESES
Considering the literature regarding the impact of emerging new parties on 
existing parties, we will set the “accommodative strategy” or “populist contagion 
hypothesis” as the main hypothesis of the study. The reasoning behind this strategy is 
that if an emerging party puts new issues on the political agenda, the mainstream 
parties will try to co-opt that issue out of fear of electoral losses (Meguid, 2005).
Hypothesis 1. The electoral manifestos of mainstream parties become more populist 
when these parties are challenged by the potential success of new populist parties.
However, other factors could also explain the evolution of mainstream parties’ 
manifestos and the adoption of populist ideas. In this sense, in addition to the irrup-
tion of new political competitors, the literature on party change identifies party 
decline as one of the most powerful external stimuli for shifts in party identity 
(Harmel and Janda, 1994). As Schumacher and van Kersbergen argue, “a lost elec-
tion indicates that a party is out of touch with public opinion” (2016: 4). In this 
context, mainstream parties may be tempted to change their agenda in order to align 
it with public opinion and improve their electoral results. The defeat of political 
parties can be understood due both to the loss of elections or to the loss of govern-
ment status. Although the two scenarios are closely related, the first one does not 
necessarily entail abandoning the government: for example, in multi-party systems 
where power can be reached through coalition formation (Harmel and Janda, 1994). 
In this regard, electoral results are important, but not equally important for all 
parties. For organizations whose primary goal is to reach the government, “the shocks 
that most dramatically shake up the party are those directly related to participation 
in government” (ibid.: 270). Thus, parties in office are expected to be less willing to 
shift identity or policy positions that have proven to be successful. In contrast, parties 
in opposition have a clearer incentive and fewer institutional restrictions to try 
different strategies or change some positions. With respect to populism, parties 
cannot be expected to sustain a credible discourse against elites and institutions when 
they are in office, if only because they form part of them. Indeed, several studies 
suggest that parties with no government responsibilities tend to emphasize anti-elite 
appeals more than parties in office (Polk et al., 2017). In a similar vein, Mudde 
suggests that mainstream opposition parties challenge the government by using 
populist arguments increasingly often (2004: 550). Therefore, the following alterna-
tive hypothesis will be assessed:
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Hypothesis 2. The electoral manifestos of mainstream parties are more populist when 
these parties are in opposition than when they are in government.
Finally, political parties are also permeable to changes that occur not only on the 
supply side (e.g. the irruption of new parties) but also on the demand side (Adams et 
al., 2004). From this demand point of view, the success of populism has been linked 
to citizen dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy and distrust towards poli-
ticians and political parties, especially in Southern Europe (Della Porta et al., 2017; 
Fernández-García and Luengo, 2019). Therefore, we could expect that if dissatisfac-
tion with political elites or with the functioning of democracy becomes a salient issue 
in public opinion, political parties will adapt their agenda to that scenario to regain 
people’s trust. Thus, the following alternative hypothesis will be assessed:
Hypothesis 3. The presence of populist elements in mainstream parties’ electoral manifestos 
is higher in elections characterized by high levels of political discontent.
METHODOLOGY
In line with previous studies in this field (March, 2017; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 
2015; Rooduijn et al., 2014; Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011), a content analysis of a 
selection of election manifestos has been carried out. On the one hand, this choice 
relates to the definition of populism as a set of ideas. In this sense, election manifestos 
provide a well-developed overview of the party ideology and its positions on different 
political and social issues. On the other hand, manifestos are official, written and open 
access documents, which make them reasonably comparable documents6.
In total, we have analyzed seven election manifestos: those for the general elections 
held in 2004, 2008, 2011, 2015 and 2016, and the manifesto for the European elec-
tions held in 2014. This selection (Table 1) aims to cover all the possible combinations 
of the three conditions that could have an effect on the PSOE’s anti-elitist and popular 
sovereignty statements: opposition/government status, levels of citizen dissatisfaction 
and populist competition. As shown in Table 1, the PSOE began the 2000s in the 
opposition, was in office between 2004 and 2011, and returned to opposition in 
November 2011. Since June 2018, the PSOE has been in power as result of a motion 
of censure that Pedro Sánchez presented against the Popular Party government, and 
continues as a government party after the November 2019 elections. With regard to 
citizens unrest, we will consider the 2011 and subsequent elections as processes charac-
terized by a background of considerable political discontent (social protests began the 
same year). For that election, unemployment rates and the state of the economy were 
6. Party activity on social networks would also be a good option to analyze the presence of popu-
list messages, but this study includes elections prior to the emergence of social networks (e.g. 
2004 and 2008).
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the principal social concerns according to the data provided by Centro de Investiga-
ciones Sociológicas (2011). However, the percentage of population that considered 
politicians, political parties and politics as one of the main problems of the country 
(Figure 2), increased significantly in 2011 (22.6 %) compared to the elections held in 
2004 and 2008 (6.3 %) and continued to grow in the following elections (2014-2019). 
Likewise, respondents who considered corruption to be one of the main problems 
in the country increased significantly since 2011. Finally, the general elections held in 
2015, 2016 and 2019 were distinguished by strong populist competition. In the 2014 
European elections, Podemos was not a real threat to the PSOE yet: it had just been 
created four months before the elections and had low electoral expectations. After this 
electoral process, however, the party gained electoral prominence at the local level with 
its local confluences, as well as in the electoral polls at the national level, thus becoming 
a threatening competitor for the largest party at the left.
There are two non-existent scenarios, that remain consequently uncovered by the 
analysis: a) the combination of opposition status, low levels of dissatisfaction and 
populist competition; and b) the combination of government status, low levels of 
dissatisfaction and populist competition.
Table 1. 
Selection criteria of the PSOE’s election manifestos
Election manifestos Government status (previous term)
High levels of dissatisfaction 




2014 (E.P.) Opposition X
2015, 2016 Opposition X X
2019 Government X X
Source: Own elaboration.
Regarding the research technique, we have conducted a quantitative content anal-
ysis using the sentence as the unit of analysis to measure the presence of populist 
features. The total number of units reached 21,331. Subsequently, we have qualita-
tively analyzed the sentences that display populism in order to identify the functions 
that the communication of these populist ideas could mean for the party as well as the 
features that populist elements have in the PSOE’s manifestos.
Taking the above literature review into consideration, the coding system for the 
quantitative analysis has followed two categories:
(1)  Anti-elitism: negative references to the elite in general as well as different 
sub-categories of elite (“establishment parties”, “the EU bureaucrats”, etc.). 
We do not code negative references to specific parties (e.g. the Popular Party) 
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or specific politicians (e.g. Mariano Rajoy) as anti-elitism. We also include 
references to practices of corruption, clientelism, cronyism, etc., as well as 
criticisms to special interests and groups (lobbies, large corporations, etc.). 
(2)  Popular sovereignty: measures to increase the power of the people by mecha-
nisms of direct democracy; general calls to give power to the people; any 
proposals promoting empowerment of the people; and positive references to 
the will or power of the people.
In the analysis, each sentence was coded as zero (absence), one (anti-elitism) or 
two (popular sovereignty). Eventually, we calculated the percentage of total sentences 
for each category per manifesto. With regard to the different lengths of the manifestos 
analyzed, we have followed the research strategy by Rooduijn et al. (2014), according 
to which the sentences of longer manifestos have more weight than the sentences of 
shorter manifestos. The reason behind this decision is that long and detailed mani-
festos are expected to contain less populism than short and concise manifestos (ibid.: 
567). Therefore, we have calculated the mean length of the seven manifestos (number 
of sentences) and their Z scores. Then, we assigned a different weight to the total 
sentences of each manifesto based on the Z score obtained for each one7. 
Finally, the reliability of the coding system was measured by means of two different 
tests: a first one to measure the stability of the results of the coder (test-retest reliability 
or intra-coder reliability test); and a second one to measure the reliability between two 
different coders (test-test reliability or inter-coder reliability test). This process was 
applied on approximately 5 % of the sample and the degree of concordance was meas-
ured by means of a Cohen’s kappa coefficient. Results showed very satisfactory levels 
of reliability for both analyses: 0.933*** for the test-retest (0,943*** in anti-elitism 
and 0,936*** in popular sovereignty); and 0.767*** for test-test (0.808*** in anti-
elitism and 0.717*** in popular sovereignty).
RESULTS
Evolution of anti-elitism and popular sovereignty in the PSOE’s election manifestos 
(2004-2019)
Figure 4 compares the presence of anti-elitism and popular sovereignty in the elec-
tion manifestos of the PSOE presented from 2004 to 2019. First, the analysis shows 
7. The Z score is a measure of how many standard deviations from the average of the population 
a data point is. For the manifestos with a Z score between 1 and 2, we gave a weight of 1.3; for 
the manifestos with a Z score of 2 or larger, we gave a weight of 1.5; for the manifestos with a 
Z score between -1 and -2, we gave a weight of 0.7; and for the manifestos with a Z score -2 or 
lower, we gave a weight of 0.5.
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that the presence of anti-elitism and popular sovereignty does not follow a linear 
trend. Without weighing the sentences, the highest levels of anti-elitism are found in 
the 2014 (European elections), 2016, 2015 and 2004 programs (which respectively 
amount to 3.1 %, 2.3 %, 1.9 % and 1.6 %), whereas the lowest levels of anti-elitism 
are found in the 2008 and 2011 programs (0.17 % and 0.96 %, respectively). 
Regarding the 2019 manifesto, it presents a lower level of anti-elitism (1.2 %) than the 
average of the seven manifestos (1.6 %). When controlling for the different lengths of 
the manifestos, the results remain very similar: the levels of anti-elitism increased 
in the 2015 and 2016 manifestos and decreased in the 2014 one.
Regarding the competition with Podemos, the differences between the anti-elitism 
in 2014 (non-populist competition) and 2016 and 2015 (populist competition) are 
minimal (without weighting the sentences, the anti-elitism in 2014 is even higher 
than in 2016 and 2015). In addition, the levels of anti-elitism are higher in 2004 
(non-populist competition) than in 2019 (populist competition). Consequently, we 
cannot conclude that the presence of anti-elitism in 2015, 2016 and 2019 manifestos 
was a consequence of the electoral threat posed by Podemos. Therefore, there is no 
empirical evidence to verify hypothesis 1; quite the opposite, the analysis suggests that 
the evolution of the anti-elitism of the PSOE is not necessarily the result of an accom-
modative strategy in response to the threat from Podemos, because this element was 
already present when the latter was not a competitor for the PSOE (e.g. 2004 and 
2014), and decreased in 2019 when Podemos was still a threat to the PSOE8. 
As for the second alternative hypothesis, the analysis shows that the presence of 
anti-elitism is higher in electoral manifestos presented by the PSOE in opposition 
(2014, 2016, 2015 and 2004) than when it was in government (2008, 2011 and 
2019). Therefore, we find empirical evidence to confirm that the PSOE presents 
higher levels of anti-elitism when it is in opposition than when it is in government9. 
In addition, we have included the electoral evolution of the party to offer a broader 
picture of the potential impact of its political decline. The results suggest a negative 
correlation between the electoral evolution of the party and the presence of anti-
elitism in its electoral programs: from 2004 to 2008, anti-elitism appeals are reduced 
while the electoral support increased; on the other hand, the percentage of anti-elitist 
sentences grew up in 2008, within a context of electoral decline. This trend is reversed 
8. Although the sample is small, we have carried out an Independent Samples t-Test to confirm 
this finding. The mean of anti-elitist sentences when there is a populist threat is slightly higher 
than the mean when there is no populist threat, but the differences are not statistically signifi-
cant (2.26 and 1.23 respectively, p-value > 0.05), thus confirming the aforementioned finding.
9. Independent Samples t-Test confirms the findings previously mentioned. The mean of anti-
elitist sentences of the manifestos presented while the party was in opposition is higher than the 
mean of anti-elitist sentences of those manifestos presented when it was in office, being these 
differences statistically significant (2.58 and 0.99 respectively, p-value < 0.05). The sample size 
of the study requires taking these statistical results with caution; however, they reinforce the 
conclusions obtained by the graphic observation of the content analysis’ results.
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in the elections held in April 2019, when populism levels dropped while the electoral 
results of the party improved10.
Regarding the third hypothesis, there is no indication to reveal a linear relation-
ship between the evolution of anti-elitism in the PSOE and the context of citizen 
discontent: the presence of anti-elitism in 2004 was higher than in 2011, when the 
levels of dissatisfaction with the economy and democracy more than doubled those for 
2004. The presence of anti-elitism in the 2004 and 2015 electoral manifestos was also 
quite similar without weighting the sentences in two very different contexts of citizen 
dissatisfaction. In addition, the levels of anti-elitism dropped significantly in the 2019 
(April) program in a scenario of political discontent very similar to that of 2016. 
However, the fact that anti-elitism was higher in 2014, 2015 and 2016 than it was in 
2004 (party in opposition) may indicate that citizen discontent has an incremental 
effect. Likewise, anti-elitism is also higher in 2019 and 2011 compared to 2008 (party 
in government), which reinforces this conclusion. Therefore, there is no evidence to 
verify hypothesis 3: the presence of anti-elitism is not higher in the manifestos 
presented in contexts of citizen discontent than in those presented with low levels 
of discontent (it does not follow a linear trend). However, the results suggest that 
citizen discontent could have some incremental effect on its presence11. Accordingly, 
our findings seem to prove only hypothesis 2: the presence of anti-elitism was higher 
in the manifestos presented when the party was in opposition (2016, 2015, 2014 and 
2004) than those presented when the party was in office (2008, 2011 and 2019). 
Regarding the presence of popular sovereignty, it presents less deviation (0.21) 
between manifestos than anti-elitism (0.96); what could suggest less dependence 
on the environment. The highest levels of popular sovereignty are found in the 
2004, 2008 and 2011 manifestos (1.46 %, 1.34 %, and 1.28 % respectively) and 
the lowest in the 2019 manifesto (0.82 %). By controlling for the length of the 
manifestos, the results of 2016 and 2015 (1.44 and 1.38) are closer to those of 
2004 and 2008. This suggests the presence of popular sovereignty in the PSOE’s 
manifestos is not related to the competition with Podemos, or citizen discontent or 
the opposition status; thus, indicating that it is a more stable and structural char-
acteristic of the party12. 
10. Although Pearson’s R linear correlation statistic shows a notable negative correlation (-.731), it 
is not significant (p-value > 0.05).
11. Pearson’s R linear correlation analysis shows that there is no evidence to confirm a linear corre-
lation between the presence of anti-elitism in election manifestos and political discontent 
(0.682, p-value > 0.05).
12. The Independent Samples t-Tests for the variables of government status and populist competi-
tion (nominal variables) and a linear R correlation of Pearson for political dissatisfaction (quan-
titative variable) confirm the findings previously mentioned. The mean of sentences containing 
appeals to popular sovereignty of the manifestos presented while the party was in government 
do not differ significantly from those presented when it was in opposition (1.25 and 1.18 
respectively, p-value > 0.05), as well as the mean of the popular sovereignty’s sentences of the 
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Figure 4. 
Presence of anti-elitism and popular sovereignty (percentage of sentences) in the 
PSOE’s election manifestos (2004-2019) and voting trend
Source: Own elaboration.
Characteristics of the anti-elitism and the defense of popular sovereignty in the PSOE’s 
manifestos
First, anti-elitism is characterized in the PSOE’s manifestos by the identification 
of undetermined powers beyond citizen control, that can interfere in the working of 
democratic institutions and harm general interests. For instance, the PSOE’s 2015 
manifesto recognizes that: “A small network of people and institutions are in a posi-
tion to condition, to a large extent, the capacity of our society to effectively carry out 
the achievement of their collective goals, and do it, in addition, in line with their 
manifestos presented with or without populist threat (1.21 and 1.2 respectively, p-value > 
0.05). Likewise, Pearson’s R linear correlation analysis shows that the percentage of sentences 
containing popular sovereignty does not maintain a statistically significant correlation with the 
percentage of respondents who indicated corruption and politicians as the main problems in 
the country (-.509, p-value > 0.05).
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interests and priorities; which do not necessarily coincide with those of the great 
majority of the population”13 (p. 167). 
However, the PSOE’s anti-elitism is softer than the one presented by Podemos 
(Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018a). For instance, Podemos’ 2015 manifesto 
states “we know and feel that the majority of people are tired of seeing institutions 
defending the interests of the powerful while they remain indifferent to the people’s 
problems”14 (p. 11). This anti-institutional tone is absent in the PSOE’s electoral 
manifestos. Moreover, Podemos’ anti-elitism is more disapproving of the political 
class. As an example, it denounces the privileges enjoyed by the political caste and 
corrupt politicians’ impunity, as well as a moral denigration of the powerful (e.g. “the 
shamelessness of a few”); and it refers to political parties as “criminal organizations” 
(2016, p. 36). In contrast, fewer negative references to politicians are found in the 
PSOE’s manifestos. For example, the party affirms “[...] citizens are seeing how some 
people come to political activity to put their interests first”15 (p. 35) but it does not 
generalize to all politicians as Podemos does, for instance, with the term “political 
caste” (Fernández-García and Luengo, 2018a; Ivaldi et al., 2017). In this sense, the 
negative references to the political elite in the PSOE’s manifestos refer to a large extent 
to the neo-liberal and right-wing hegemony at the European level which pursues 
different interests from those of the people.
Second, the negative references to economic powers and particular interests are a 
defining feature of PSOE’s anti-elitism. The party proposes measures to limit the 
interference of private and corporate interests in the regular working of political insti-
tutions, as well as to guarantee the independence of political powers, the media, 
culture and the judicial authorities from economic power groups. For example, the 
PSOE’s election manifesto of 2016 says, “Only with active, vigilant and well-in-
formed citizens can the popular mandate of elections be prevented from being 
distorted by economic pressures and interest groups”16 (p. 18). The PSOE also reports 
that “in Spain, economic power is too concentrated and has too much influence on 
13. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “Una reducida red de personas e instituciones 
se encuentran en posición de condicionar, en buena medida, la capacidad de nuestra sociedad 
para realizar con eficacia la consecución de sus metas colectivas, y hacerlo, además, acorde con 
sus intereses y prioridades, que no necesariamente coinciden con los de la gran mayoría de la 
población”.
14. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “Sabemos y sentimos que somos mayoría las 
personas hartas de ver a las instituciones defendiendo los intereses de los poderosos mientras 
permanecen indiferentes a los problemas de la gente”.
15. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “En una situación de enorme dificultad, la 
ciudadanía está viendo cómo algunas personas llegan a la actividad política para anteponer sus 
intereses particulares y su lucro personal al bien común”.
16. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “Solo con una ciudadanía activa, atenta y bien 
informada se puede evitar que el mandato popular de las elecciones quede torcido por las 
presiones económicas y los grupos de interés”.
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political power”17 (p. 15). The party also proposes different redistributive measures 
that increase taxes on large fortunes and major corporations as well as negative refer-
ences to big businesses and banks. For instance, the PSOE promises that “we will 
make sure that the banks never again gamble with the lives of the citizens”18 (p. 10). 
Third, references to different practices of collusion, political corruption, and 
concentration of power are also found in the PSOE’s manifestos. Besides the negative 
references to corrupt practices, we also found disapproving references to practices of 
concentration of economic power, to the opacity and secrecy in decision-making 
processes and measures to eliminate the “revolving door” (government-industry) and 
other privileges. 
With regard to the presence of popular sovereignty, the biggest difference between 
Podemos and the PSOE lies in the radicalization of popular sovereignty by the intro-
duction of different direct democracy mechanisms (Fernández-García and Luengo, 
2018a). In the case of the PSOE’s manifestos, the sentences within this category are 
measures to regulate the existing mechanisms to materialize citizen initiatives in a 
more favorable way. On the contrary, Podemos proposes the introduction and gener-
alization of the main mechanisms of direct democracy. It supports “the right to 
decide” of regions (i.e. referendums to decide the independence of certain regions); 
the compulsory use of referendums on specific issues (e.g. the participation of armed 
forces in international conflicts); the promotion of popular initiatives; the introduc-
tion of the popular veto initiative; and the introduction of the “right of recall” (e.g. 
2015 manifesto). In addition, the PSOE’s manifestos include several references 
to increase the participation of the people in politics as well as general promises to 
empower the people, follow the will of the people and return power to citizens. As the 
party claims, the organization pursues “a participative democracy, activating mecha-
nisms of deliberation, consult and accountability”19 (p. 22).
Finally, not only the degree (mentioned above) but also the function that these 
populist elements have on the PSOE’s manifestos seems to vary depending on the 
context in which they were presented. In this sense, we identify three different func-
tions that populist arguments could play in the PSOE’s manifestos. First, the PSOE’s 
populist elements are used to reconnect with the people in contexts of cynicism and 
political discontent. Moreover, they use some anti-elitist arguments and promise to 
empower the people in order to display an understanding of the reasons for citizen 
dissatisfaction. Thereby, in those manifestos presented in contexts of high levels of 
political discontent (2011-2019), we find statements like the following: “In a 
17. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “En España el poder económico está demasiado 
concentrado e influye demasiado sobre el poder político”.
18. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “Nos aseguraremos de que nunca más los bancos 
vuelvan a apostar con la vida de la ciudadanía”.
19. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “[…] Una democracia participativa, activando 
mecanismos de deliberación, consulta y rendición de cuentas”.
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situation of enormous difficulty, citizens are seeing how some people come to political 
activity in order to put their personal interests and personal gain before the common 
good. These cases of corruption are leading the Spanish people to a deep sense of 
hopelessness and distrust of almost all democratic institutions, where political parties 
occupy a special place”20 (2015, p. 35).
Second, populist arguments are used as a weapon against the main political 
competitor, especially when the party is in opposition. For example, in the 2004 elec-
tions when the PSOE was in opposition and its relations with the governing party, 
Popular Party, were badly damaged by the participation of Spain in the Iraq war, the 
anti-elitism of the PSOE was characterized by sentences like the following: “[...] The 
Spanish people have suffered a government that has put politics at the service of 
personal, partisan or group interests; that it has colonized the largest companies and 
most of the media and that itself has been colonized, in turn, by them; that has occu-
pied the strategic institutions of civil society in an interpenetration between political 
and economic interests [...]”21 (p. 31).
The third function identified is the blame shifting or scapegoating, a traditional 
function of populist discourse. In this sense, the PSOE’s manifestos express several 
negative references against economic powers in order to blame them for the problems 
of the people. This function is observed, for example, in the 2011 manifesto, when the 
party was in office and was accused by the opposition and citizens for mishandling 
the 2008 economic crisis:
Citizens from all over the world demand a greater presence of politics, which must 
recover an abandoned space during the last decades to economic powers. It is not 
acceptable that the destiny of the lives of millions of people, their jobs and their mate-
rial well-being, depends on arbitrary decisions of international financial markets whose 
decisions sometimes have a greater influence on the economy of a country than the 
political representatives, who are democratically elected by its citizens (p. 6)22.
20. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “En una situación de enorme dificultad, la 
ciudadanía está viendo cómo algunas personas llegan a la actividad política para anteponer 
sus intereses particulares y su lucro personal al bien común. Estos casos de corrupción están 
sumiendo a la población española en una profunda desesperanza y en desconfianza hacia casi 
todas las instituciones democráticas, donde los partidos políticos ocupan un lugar especial”.
21. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “[...] Los españoles hemos padecido un Gobierno 
que ha puesto la política al servicio de intereses personales, partidarios o grupales; que ha colo-
nizado las mayores empresas y la mayoría de los medios de comunicación y que se ha dejado 
colonizar, a su vez, por ellos; que ha ocupado las instituciones estratégicas de la sociedad civil 
en una interpenetración entre intereses políticos y económicos [...]”.
22. Own translation from the original in Spanish: “Los ciudadanos de todo el mundo reclaman una 
mayor presencia de la política, que debe recuperar un espacio abandonado durante las últimas 
décadas a los poderes económicos. No es aceptable que el destino de la vida de millones de 
personas, de sus empleos y de su bienestar material, dependa de decisiones arbitrarias de unos 
mercados financieros internacionales cuyas decisiones tienen en ocasiones mayor influencia 
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CONCLUSION
Based on some prominent literature that suggests the potential impact of the 
abrupt ascent of new political competitors on established parties, the aim of this 
article was to assess the potential programmatic contagion experienced by the 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) as a consequence of the electoral irruption 
of a new populist competitor, Podemos. We examined the extent to which the 
PSOE has incorporated some populist features into its discourse in order to compete 
against Podemos. 
Firstly, from a qualitative point of view, the analysis shows that the party’s mani-
festos occasionally present a “soft populism” characterized by negative statements 
against undetermined powers, economic groups and neo-liberal elites for pursuing 
interests that contradict those of the people. In addition, the party’s manifestos claim 
that certain special interests and powerful groups can interfere in the functioning of 
democratic institutions. In response to this situation, the PSOE promises to make the 
Spanish and European Union political systems more accountable, transparent and 
participative in order to safeguard the people’s will and interests.
Secondly, the results suggest that the use of populist messages plays three main 
functions in the PSOE’s manifestos, depending on the context: a) to show empathy 
and understanding with people’s unrest in contexts of citizen dissatisfaction; b) to 
attack the main political competitor when the party is in opposition; and c) to use 
economic powers and other elites as scapegoats for people’s problems, especially when 
the party is in government. This last function is fundamental to understand the reason 
why a government party would use certain populist arguments. 
With regard to the evolution of the PSOE’s manifestos, the results suggest that the 
presence of statements in favor of popular sovereignty is quite stable and does not have 
any interaction with the analyzed factors, namely, populist competition, opposition 
status and context of citizen discontent). In contrast, the presence of anti-elitism seems to 
be related to the party’s opposition status (2004, 2014, 2015 and 2016). Citizen discon-
tent also seems to have an incremental effect on PSOE’s anti-elitism levels, although 
it is not the main factor. The levels of anti-elitism were always higher when the party 
was in opposition than when it was in office (even when the levels of political discon-
tent were higher). However, citizen dissatisfaction seems to increase the levels of anti-
elitism in both scenarios: when the party is in opposition (anti-elitism was more 
prevalent in 2014, 2015 and 2016 manifestos than in 2004) and when it is in govern-
ment (the levels of anti-elitism were higher in 2019 and 2011 than in 2008). Finally, 
it is not possible to conclude that the appearance of anti-elitism in the 2015 and 2016 
programs (populist competition) is the result of the electoral threat posed by Podemos, 
since its presence was lower than in the 2014 manifesto (Podemos was not a real 
sobre la economía de un país que los propios representantes políticos elegidos democrática-
mente por sus ciudadanos”.
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competitor for the PSOE yet). In addition, the presence of anti-elitism in the 2019 
manifesto (populist competition) was lower than in the 2004 manifesto (when 
neither Podemos nor any other populist competitor even existed) and the 2014 one 
(when Podemos was not a threat to the PSOE yet). Thus, the main hypothesis of the 
article cannot be confirmed; since there is no evidence to prove that the presence of 
populist elements in the PSOE’s manifestos for the elections held in 2015, 2016 and 
2019 was the result of an accommodative strategy in response to Podemos’s threat. 
On the contrary, the second alternative hypothesis can be confirmed (if applied to 
the levels of anti-elitism, but not to the claims of popular sovereignty).
Therefore, some populist elements were found in the PSOE’s electoral manifestos. 
However, the evolution of these elements suggests that they are not the result of an 
accommodative strategy in response to the success of Podemos but rather the political 
decline of the party, especially in contexts of citizen dissatisfaction with political actors 
and the functioning of democracy. Thus, the main results suggest that the political 
decline of parties could be a stronger external force than the rise of new parties when 
explaining the shifts in party identity, at least, in our case study. That is, experiencing 
an actual political decline seems to be a stronger explanatory factor than the fear of 
experiencing electoral losses due to the presence of a threatening competitor.
The main findings of this article are, thus, in line with previous research conducted 
by Rooduijn et al. (2014) and Manucci and Weber (2017). These authors state that 
there is no empirical evidence to confirm that populism (as a thin ideology) has a 
contagious effect on mainstream parties. It is very interesting to note that previous 
research found that successful anti-immigrant parties (Van Spanje, 2010) or radical 
right-wing parties (Harmel and Svasand, 1997; Han, 2015; Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen; 2016; Abou-Chadi and Krause, 2018) do have a contagious effect on 
mainstream parties’ positions. This suggests that certain aspects of the host ideologies 
of populist parties (e.g. nativism) could have more effects on their competitors than 
their populist appeals.
Regarding the anti-elitism found in the PSOE’s manifestos, especially when the 
party is in opposition and suffers poor electoral performance, it would be in line with 
the results of Manucci and Weber (2017), who observed that populism is a cyclical 
phenomenon rather than a linear one. This is probably related to the electoral cycles 
of political parties as our results seem to indicate. In addition, these conclusions would 
be congruent with those authors that suggest parties in opposition are more likely to 
emphasize anti-elite rhetoric than those in government (Polk et al., 2017). Hence, 
political parties may find it attractive to engage in populist messages when they are 
suffering an electoral decline or losing power, especially in contexts of high political 
discontent and cynicism as a way to reconnect with the people. This fact could be 
interpreted as an electoral strategy based on the generation of empathy, closeness and 
understanding with the electorate. On the contrary, it is expectable that parties cannot 
sustain a credible discourse against elites and institutions when they are in office and 
consequently, clearly part of them. In other words, there would be an intrinsic tension 
between being in office and maintaining an anti-establishment discourse. 
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In this study, we found that in certain occasions, political parties can use elites and 
“factual” powers as scapegoats when they are in government as a way to avoid 
the responsibility of bad management. However, in light of the results obtained by the 
PSOE in 2011, this strategy does not seem successful in electoral terms, which could 
explain why parties in government tend not to use it. In this regard, the literature on 
party competition suggests that parties tend to compete by accentuating those issues 
on which they have an undoubted advantage (Meguid, 2005). In the case of tradi-
tional government parties, they can capitalize on the experience in office as an advan-
tage, for example. However, anti-elitism seems a more advantageous matter for 
outsiders and new parties; so it might be discouraged for majority parties.
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